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protection. 
The study was carried out by Orapan Nabangchang 
from the Sukhothai Thammatirat Open University. She 
used the Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) to 
determine the economic value of a group of Thailand’s 
endangered animal species. Information was gathered 
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a 250 Baht income tax surcharge to generate funds for 
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PRIVATE CONTRIBUTIONS TOWARDS THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC 




The study explored the issue of private contributions towards the provision of 
public goods. The Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) was employed to determine the 
economic value of a group of Thailand’s endangered animal species with 955 face-to-
face interviews conducted in Bangkok.  The study explored the differences between 
mandatory and voluntary payment mechanisms and examined responses to fundraising 
campaign incentives such as seed money and refund options.   The results indicated that 
there was a higher probability of positive responses to the Willingness to Pay (WTP) 
question under the mandatory rather than the voluntary payment mechanism.  However, 
seed money and refund features did not increase the probability of willingness to pay.  
 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Endangered species, as environmental goods, consist of both use and non-use 
values.  The direct economic benefits or direct use values can be extractive such as 
hunting and angling, or non-extractive as in the case of eco-tourism. The economic worth 
of wildlife also consists of a range of indirect benefits that are not tradable in the market 
and do not have market value. These indirect use values could come from the animals’ 
functional contribution to the balance and health of the eco-systems in which they thrive. 
On the other hand, non-use values can be attached to wildlife for their continued 
existence even though a person may not directly or indirectly benefit from them either 
now or at any definite time in the future (existence value). A person can also attach 
values to wildlife in that future generations may benefit from them (bequest value). 
The ratio between use and non-use values will differ across countries at different 
stages of development as will values related to wildlife and the importance of 
conservation among various socio-economic groups.  People’s attitudes to wildlife are 
shaped by religious, cultural, social and economic factors (Manfredo, Teel and Bright 
2003). In developed countries, many studies have used the Contingent Valuation Method 
(CVM) to capture the non-use values of wildlife and explore the variables that determines 
such values.   Studies have looked into the importance of information and knowledge by 
exploring how they shape our understanding of the risks, concerns and values as 
expressed in terms of willingness to make personal trade-offs by making private 
contributions to wildlife conservation.   
While indirect uses and non-uses account for the larger part of the total economic 
value of endangered species, there have been few studies in developing countries on 
estimating non-use values and exploring their policy implications. The economics of 
wildlife conservation depend on understanding what shapes non-use values of different 
segments of the population and in having clearer perceptions of what people know, their 
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understanding of the importance of wildlife, and what shapes their preferences. The 
purpose of this study was to develop an understanding of these issues in the context of an 
urban society in a developing country ― Thailand.   This study explored the profiles of 
people who were already making private contributions to environmental and wildlife-
related causes and examined differences between them and samples drawn from the 
general public in terms of motives, knowledge and awareness of risks, and causes of 
extinction of a selected group of Thailand’s endangered animal species.  The CVM was 
employed to estimate the economic benefits of endangered species conservation.  The 
study also explored payment vehicle effects for mandatory and voluntary payment 
mechanisms as well as responses to various incentives incorporated into fundraising 
campaigns such as seed money and the option of receiving refunds from contributions in 
the event that the conservation program in question was not launched.   
 
2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Philanthropic Behaviour  
Economic logic presumes that given an individual’s self-interest, people will tend 
to free-ride on others’ private contributions to public goods (Samuelson 1954). 
Meanwhile, economic theory assumes that people derive satisfaction only from the 
consumption of private goods and the total provision of public goods (Warr 1982; 
Roberts 1984; Bergstrom, Blume and Varian 1986).  Yet in social and economic settings, 
particularly in developed countries, the charitable sector plays quite a significant role 
both in the number of contributors and the value of donations.  Private contributors 
voluntarily donate despite strong incentives to free ride.  The Independent Sector Survey 
of 2,500 households in 1997 showed that an average person in the US spent USD 1,000 
per year on charitable causes while individual tax payers accounted for 77% of the total 
dollars donated in 1998 (Independent Sector 1994).  The profiles of contributors were 
found to correspond to income levels, i.e., the higher the income, the greater the 
likelihood of giving and the higher the sum donated.  Donations to environmental causes 
were made by 11.5% of US households which gave an average of USD 110, equivalent to 
1.6% of the average total household income. Randolph (1995) used the tax returns of 
around 12,000 individuals from 1979 to 1988 to construct a profile of the charitable 
sector.  He found a U-shaped giving pattern. That is, the lower income group gave over 
4% of its income.  As incomes rose, the proportion reduced to 1.3% and then increased to 
about 3.4% in the highest income group.  Randolph (1995) also found that higher 
educated people gave more often, more money and a higher fraction of their income. 
Older people also gave a greater fraction of their income and poorer people tended to 
give more to religious causes.   
It has been generally acknowledged that economic analysis cannot reveal all the 
subtle and complex influences on giving, hence answers to questions on why people give 
have come from the social science discipline.    Studies have looked into plausible social 
explanations such as religious beliefs, basic human desire to help, peer pressure at work, 
and the need to send out signals on one’s social status (Rose-Ackerman 1996). Other 
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factors influencing behaviour that have been studied included cultural factors, gender 
(Andreoni and Vesterlund 2001; Eckel and Grossman 1998), social capital (Glaeser et al. 
2000) and in-group effects (Polzer, Stewart and Simmons 1999).  While it is the general 
assumption that other non-economic factors such as social groupings, religious 
organizations, and activities of the fundraisers can have an impact on economic 
behaviour,  economic studies on these social factors have revealed that such effects are 
small (Andreoni and Scholz 1998) although they could nonetheless provide insights into 
the concept of giving.  
In “The Price of Virtue ― the Economic Value of the Charitable Sector”, Foster 
et al. (2001) divided the social value of charities into two categories according to the 
groups of beneficiaries, namely, the target groups or the direct users of the charity, and 
the rest of society or the indirect users. Indirect benefits can be derived from the 
following: (i) altruistic benefits, in this case defined as the benefits from simply knowing 
that contributions could (in some way) help prevent the extinction of endangered species; 
(ii) external benefits, referring  to the spin-off effects on others who do not form part of 
the target group; (iii) option benefits referring to the motive to give in anticipation of the 
likelihood that some benefits may be gained from those charities in the future; (iv) “warm 
glow” benefits described as “impure altruism” (Andreoni 1990) where the donors’ 
satisfaction is derived from the knowledge of their generosity, including social 
recognition as donors, over and above altruistic sentiments towards the beneficiaries; and 
(v) private benefits of volunteers to charities in the form of moral satisfaction, social 
contacts and work experiences.  Many studies have been undertaken to explore the 
economic logic of people’s behaviour in these respects.  However, studies on private 
contributions towards the provision of public goods have been almost entirely conducted 
in developed countries, albeit with different income, social and cultural backgrounds. In 
the following section, some of the literature exploring these areas are reviewed, providing 
a base for the conceptual framework of this study. Studies on the influence of the actual 
design of fundraising campaigns such as offering seed money, leadership (in terms of 
some large donors leading the way for others to follow) and refund options are also 
reviewed.   
 
2.2 The “Warm Glow” Effect 
From the various experiments he conducted to explore the nature of philanthropic 
behaviour, Andreoni (1993) argued that people received internal satisfaction from giving. 
Giving to charity was like buying another good; the more you bought, the greater the 
satisfaction.  He defined this sense of satisfaction derived from the act of charity as the 
“warm glow” or the utility that an individual derived from the act of giving in addition to 
the provision of the public good itself. He further put forward that it represented a core 
economic motivation for giving.  The act of giving itself increased an individual’s utility 
while the relationship between the utility derived and the act of giving was described as 
being conditioned by an individual’s private consumption, the quantity of the public good 
and the individual’s own contribution to the public good (Andreoni 1988; 1989).     
 3
 
In Johansson-Stenman and Svedsäter’s (2001) study on “Self-Image and Choice 
Experiments: Hypothetical and Actual Willingness to Pay”, the warm glow  sentiment 
was equated with the individual’s self-image which in turn was influenced by the desire 
to see oneself as “nice” (Akerlof and Dickens 1982), the honesty to oneself, and the 
consistency between actions and previously made statements or commitments (Aronson 
1992).  It was hypothesized that if the respondents knew that a situation was hypothetical, 
they would also know that the preferences given in the survey questionnaire would not 
affect either their individual private consumption or their expenditure on public goods. 
Since utility maximization was conditioned solely by the desire to maximize self-image 
in this case, there would be a tendency to overstate the willingness to pay (WTP).  Hence, 
Johansson-Stenman and Svedsäter (2003) postulated that “hypothetical WTP will exceed 
actual WTP in cases which involve an important perceived ethical dimension and where 
a high WTP is considered ethically commendable, but not otherwise”.   According to the 
authors, choices affecting animals, which were the focus of their study, were examples of 
choices involving ethical considerations, hence, the stated Mean Willingness to Pay 
(MWTP) under hypothetical situations was likely to be higher than the actual MWTP.  
Several studies have been conducted which suggest that the tendency to be generous in 
verbal pledges to donate might not be the case when actual payment is required (Farrell 
1995; Cummings and Taylor 1999). 
 
2.3  The Influence of Seed Money and Leadership 
Seed money is an initial contribution given to the conservation trust fund, which 
could come from large donors, companies, or even from the government. Technically, 
having some seed money or getting some celebrities to make big donations should send 
off signals of credibility and a high probability that the conservation program will be 
actually launched. Several studies have been conducted to understand how the presence 
of seed money and the influence of donor-leaders can induce positive responses to giving.  
Andreoni (1998a; 1998b) publicly announced that seed money would increase charitable 
donations.   For a “threshold public good” (which requires a minimum amount of funds if 
the investment in public goods is to be made at all), there would be a Nash equilibrium (a 
win-win situation for each actor where neither would have to give anything at all) with 
zero charitable giving, in the absence of seed money. Donor-leaders could, on the other 
hand, provide enough seed money to ensure surpassing the threshold in the public 
funding drive, thus eliminating the zero-equilibrium (Andreoni 1998a; 1999b).  
Vesterlund (1998) observed that leadership involvement sent signals about the 
quality of the public good and that where there was already complete information about 
the quality of the public good, announcements about celebrities making donations had 
negligible effects on contributions; in the absence of information, however, leadership 
involvement had a lot of impact.  Reconfirming Vesterlund’s findings, Potters, Sefton 
and Vesterlund (2001) also indicated that announcements caused substantial increases in 
donations as followers made inferences from the leaders’ announced contributions and 
tended to match them. Based on information obtained from a survey on a university 
campaign covering 3,000 households, List and Lucking-Reiley (2002) found that 
increasing seed money from 10% to 67% of the campaign goal would increase donations 
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by six-fold.  The study also found that introducing refunds if the threshold was not 
reached would increase contributions by 20%. 
 
2.4 Related Studies on Valuations of Wildlife and Endangered Species  
One of the most widely used methods to estimate the value of environmental 
goods is the Contingent Valuation Method (CVM).   Over the years, as more and more 
researchers have adopted this research tool, the body of knowledge on how to apply it to 
obtain as accurate a value for environmental goods as possible has grown.    
Reaves, Kramer and Holmes (1999) conducted a CVM survey to estimate the 
value of protection and restoration of a bird and its habitats.  The subject of the valuation 
was the red-cockaded woodpecker, listed as endangered in 1970.  Since it was not largely 
known to the general population and had non-consumptive use value to a very small 
segment of the population, its non-use values made up most of its total value.  The survey 
was conducted soon after Hurricane Hugo struck the Francis Marion National Forest in 
1989 and the authors assumed that the incident did much to attract the attention of people 
to the red-cockaded woodpecker compared to normal circumstances. The study explored 
three main areas.  The first was the importance of the format of the questions. This was 
done by comparing the differences in survey response rates, item non-response (questions 
in the questionnaire that were not answered) rates and protest bids from responses to 
varying CV question formats in the survey. Two other research questions were whether 
measures of central tendency (where responses tend to be similar no matter what CV 
question formats are adopted in the survey) suggested convergent validity across formats 
and whether welfare values obtained from the different question formats were influenced 
by similar determinant factors. The researchers used the open-ended, payment card and 
double-ended dichotomous choice question formats. Information provided in the 
questionnaire was on the probability of survival of the red-cockaded woodpecker 
population for several population sizes and the management of the conservation 
programme.  
The elements of uncertainty introduced in the CV scenarios created complexities 
for the respondents, but were believed to be a most accurate way of portraying 
conservation options. Respondents were asked their WTP to an independent foundation 
set up with the specific mandate of protecting and restoring the endangered red-cockaded 
woodpecker, their WTP each year to protect the remaining habitats to maintain the 
existing probability of the birds’ survival (50%), and their WTP to finance specific 
restoration activities which would improve the woodpecker population’s chance of 
survival from 50% to 99%.   The study found a lower response rate, a higher item non-
response rate and a higher level of protest responses for the dichotomous choice format 
compared to the open-ended or payment card formats.  Convergent validity was found in 
a three-way comparison of non-use values. 
 Yen, Boxall and Adamowicz (1997) conducted an econometric analysis on 
donations for environmental conservation. Their study addressed the situation where 
funding for environmental programmes in North America relied increasingly on private 
donations either directly or through membership organizations.  The study explored the 
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relationship between factors such as income, marginal tax rate, wildlife-related activities 
and marginal propensity to donate. The econometric model of the study included a two-
level decision structure which reflected the two sequential decision-making processes of 
individuals, firstly whether or not to donate, and subject to that decision, on how much to 
donate. It was hypothesized that these decisions were made differently.  The key findings 
were that income had the largest impact on the probability of donation while a marginal 
tax rate was not significant in explaining charitable behaviour. A third factor explored 
was the economic activities themselves, namely recreational hunting and angling, which 
were the traditional sources of revenue for wildlife habitat and endangered species 
protection, particularly in Canada.   A model was constructed to forecast changes in 
donation that resulted from the decline of these activities.  It was found that while a 
decline in consumptive uses resulted in corresponding reductions in donations, the 
impacts were not large and may be offset by non-consumptive uses.    
Motivations can also be influenced by the payment mechanisms which offer 
different incentives.  Values can be influenced by the payment mechanisms themselves 
and some studies have found that the credibility of the mechanism mattered more than the 
potential effect of different incentives (Jakobsson and Dragun 1996; Bateman et al. 
1995).  Champ, Boyle and Brown (2003), for example, used a three-way split sample 
survey design to collect data from three independent samples via mail to compare 
differences in WTP from different payment mechanisms: (i) a voluntary contribution to a 
trust fund; (ii) a provision point mechanism involving a voluntary contribution which 
specified that at least 30% of the households would have to donate or the property (an 
open space land in Boulder county) could not be purchased, and that money would be 
paid back if insufficient contributions were made and also if there were surplus 
contributions; and (iii) a one-time tax increase based on the results of a referendum.  The 
researchers found that respondents were more likely to answer affirmatively to the WTP 
question when posed as a referendum vote than when posed as a request for a donation1.  
There were also more positive responses to the provision point mechanism than to 
individual contribution.  To test this, samples were split according to the payment 
vehicles, which offered different approaches to funds mobilization and different 
incentives. 
Options within fundraising campaigns can also induce the probability of 
contributions, such as matching funds and refunds of money in the event that inadequate 
contributions are raised.  The payment vehicles in this study followed, in part, the 
findings of Brubaker (1975) that individuals would pay if given assurances that the 
remainder of the community would make appropriate matching offers along with a 
money-back guarantee in the event that sufficient contributions were not received. If both 
assurances could be given, then the public good would be provided (Brubaker 1975). 
These findings were confirmed by Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) who found that donations 
                                      
1 When posed as a referendum, respondents are asked to vote “for” or “against” a given bid amount. If the 
referendum passes (i.e., the majority votes “for” it), then everyone will have to pay, even the ones who 
voted against it.   In the case of a request for a donation, the decision to donate or not and how much is 
voluntary and up to the individual. 
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would increase if there were indications that there would be refunds if not enough money 
was solicited.  Similar findings were reported by Bagnoli and McKee (1991) and List and 




3.1 Respondents and Survey Protocol 
The Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) was used as a tool for estimating the 
value of a group of Thailand’s endangered species which comprised elephants, dugongs, 
gibbons, hornbills, marine turtles and tigers. As one of the objectives of the study was to 
develop an understanding of the charitable sector market for wildlife protection and 
conservation, the study covered two groups of respondents.  One was referred to as 
‘general respondents’ and was randomly sampled by the National Statistical Office 
(NSO) of Thailand from the population-sampling frame for Bangkok used in past socio-
economic surveys2. The other group of respondents was made up of ‘donors’, referring to 
those who were already regular contributors to charitable organizations working on 
animals in general, and wildlife and habitats in particular.  The intention was to analyse 
the socio-economic profiles of existing donors to wildlife causes and compare these with 
those of the general public. Whether they belonged to a distinct socio-economic group 
and what motivated their charitable behaviour would be beneficial information for 
campaigners, the public or other interested groups in directing efforts to those with strong 
tendencies to contribute.     
For the general respondents group, enumerators were instructed to locate 
respondents who were household heads, of working age, employed and responsible for 
decision-making over household expenditure based on addresses given by the NSO for 
the 50 districts of Bangkok.  Replacements were allowed only if selected respondents had 
moved or addresses had changed; in such cases, replacements were then randomly 
selected from within the same residential block.   Purposive sampling was used to 
identify donors who were living in Bangkok and provinces in the vicinity. 3   This was 
because adopting a random sampling of the general population of Bangkok was unlikely 
to generate an adequate number of donor samples for comparison purposes. The selected 
samples were contacted initially by telephone to request for interview appointments.  
Face-to-face interviews were administered with 955 samples; 840 general respondents 
and 155 donors.      
                                      
2 The NSO used simple random sampling techniques to provide a sample size of 2,200 people using the 
NSO’s sampling frame for the 50 districts of Bangkok.   
3 The list of donors was from obtained from eight NGOs working with animals and wildlife. These 
included (i) the Sueb Nakhasathien Foundation, (ii) Wild Animal Rescue (WAR), (iii) World Wildlife Fund 
(WWF), (iv) the Thai Society for the Protection of Cruelty to Animals (TSPCA), (v) the Hornbill Rescue 
Foundation (HRF), (vi) the Bird Conservation Society of Thailand (BCST), (vii) the Wildlife Fund 
Thailand  (WFT), and (viii) the Thai Animal Guardian Association (Thai AGA). A total of 1,369 letters 




3.2 Questionnaire Structure and the CV Scenario 
The questionnaire was drafted based on information obtained from four Focus 
Group Discussions (FGDs) and two pre-tests4.   The finalized questionnaire consisted of 
four main sections.   The first section sought to uncover what the current demand for 
wildlife conservation was, i.e., how many people were contributing, what type of people 
contributed, etc. A set of warm-up questions was asked to develop the profile of the 
different respondent groups, some of which were used in the analysis of determinants of 
Willingness to Pay (WTP) in the logit models.  These included some of the attitudinal 
factors explored by previous studies discussed earlier such as altruism, warm glow, 
impact of social influences including leadership, positive and negative peer group 
pressure, self-image (of the donors), attitudes towards the charitable sector and past 
donations.   
 The second part contained a set of questions on knowledge about wildlife, 
importance attached to conservation measures relative to human needs and trust placed in 
conservation agencies, past and current contributions to wildlife conservation activities, 
and awareness of the risk of extinction.   As opposed to asking respondents to rank the six 
chosen species (tigers, elephants, dugongs, gibbons, marine turtles and hornbills) in order 
of preference as to how they would like public resources to be allocated, respondents 
were shown photographs of the animals, two at a time and were asked what their choice 
would be, if the budget available was only enough to save one. Altogether, 15 paired 
combinations were shown.   No additional information was provided on the animals such 
as the numbers that were left, comparative risks of extinction, and measures already 
undertaken.  The respondents were reminded only that decisions involved trade-offs, i.e., 
their answers might make a difference to the chances of survival of some at the expense 
of others.  In addition to this pairing exercise, a series of questions was posed to capture 
the relative preferences for the six endangered species and the respondents’ perceptions 
of the importance of these in terms of their ecological, social and economic value. The 
respondents were also questioned on their trust in the usage of donations for the stated 
objectives which were to conserve the specific endangered animals in Thailand.  
The third section of the questionnaire was the contingent valuation scenario and 
description of the payment mechanisms (described in detail below) followed by the final 
section on the socio-economic profiles of the respondents.  
 
3.3 The CV Scenario: The Environmental Good Being Valued 
The information provided in the CV scenario was based on various considerations 
such as (i) the effect of information on responses (Boyle 1989); (ii) taking precautions on 
the possibility that the absence of specific information on species would result in biased 
                                      
4 FGDs were organized between April and July 2004 with (i) donors, (ii) university students, (iii) low 
income groups, and (iv) middle to high income groups.  Altogether, 280 respondents were interviewed in 
two pre-tests in April and September 2004.  The survey was administered between March and April 2005.  
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WTP estimates (Carmines and Zeller 1979); (iii) how important information was, 
particularly in cases where the respondents were not fully aware of how they currently 
benefitted from a resource or how they could benefit from it in the future (Bergstrom, 
Stoll and Randall 1990); and (iv) the need to clearly communicate the objectives of the 
proposed policy intervention and the impacts leaving as little room as possible for 
respondents to make their own different assumptions.   All these factors were balanced 
against the time constraint in conducting the interviews.   
The scenario described the situation of Thailand’s wildlife; what was already 
being done and what was being proposed.  Respondents were given information about the 
ongoing efforts of both the public sector and a number of non-profit organizations 
working to save various endangered species.  They were alerted to the human resource 
constraints of having to focus on issue-specific and species-specific tasks, and generally 
being too overwhelmed by immediate tasks to allocate time and resources to longer term 
measures to address the root causes of the threats to endangered species.   
The respondents were then introduced to the proposed Comprehensive 
Programme for the Protection and Conservation of Endangered Wildlife. The programme 
would cover four major areas: (i) wildlife habitat protection; (ii) in-depth studies on 
wildlife; (iii) the prevention of poaching of wildlife and illegal trade of wildlife and 
wildlife products; and (iv) wildlife rehabilitation and return to the wild.  The respondents 
were told that the proposed programme would provide additional support so that existing 
efforts could be executed on a more comprehensive scale plus provide the additional 
advantage of greater coordination among concerned agencies.  They were also informed 
that because of financial limitations, a survey was being undertaken to explore the extent 
to which the general public would be willing to support the wildlife conservation 
program by contributing to a trust fund.  This trust fund would be managed by a 
committee with a balanced representation of government and non-government 
organizations to achieve a greater intensity of efforts and would encompass an in-built 
check and balance mechanism, hence, there would be transparency in the use of the 
funds.   The CV scenario also clearly indicated that while greater benefits could be 
expected, no 100% certainty of positive outcomes could be given. 
  
3.4 Payment Mechanisms and Hypotheses 
 The information above provided the context for posing the valuation question.  
Respondents were asked whether they would be willing to contribute a specified amount; 
a one-time payment which would be used to set up a trust fund to finance the proposed 
Comprehensive Programme for the Protection and Conservation of Endangered Wildlife.   
There were two payment mechanisms. One was a mandatory payment mechanism 
where respondents were asked to vote ‘for’ or ‘against’ a referendum to impose an 
income tax surcharge which would be used to set up a ‘Wildlife Protection and 
Conservation Fund’. The other was a voluntary payment mechanism where respondents 
were asked to decide whether or not to contribute to a ‘Wildlife Protection and 
Conservation Fund’.  The difference between the two payment mechanisms was that for 
the mandatory payment mechanism, in the event that the majority voted ‘for’ the 
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referendum, the policy to impose the income tax surcharge would affect everyone 
regardless of how they voted.  Free riding would thus become less of an issue.  In the 
voluntary mechanism, on the other hand, an individual would not affect or be affected by 
other respondents’ decisions.   
For each of these payment mechanisms, there were two variants, these being 
additional features of the funds mobilization campaign.  The intention of adding these 
features was to test their effects on willingness to pay. For the mandatory payment 
mechanism, this was seed money. The two mandatory payment mechanisms were 
referendums to impose an income tax surcharge ‘with’ and ‘without’ the seed money 
component.  In the ‘with’ seed money option, respondents were told that for the 
programme to go ahead, the government would make the initial effort of mobilizing 
funds from large donors.  The condition was that if less than 25% was mobilized, the 
programme would not go ahead even if the majority of the people voted for the policy.  In 
the ‘without’ seed money option, the existence of seed money from large donors was not 
a prerequisite feature of the mobilization campaign.   
In the voluntary payment mechanism, there were also two variants, i.e., ‘with’ and 
‘without’ seed money and refunds.   In the ‘with’ seed money and refund option, the 
respondents were informed that prior to mobilizing funds from the general public, the 
government would approach large donors and private companies to contribute funds as 
seed money.  The conservation program would be launched if 25% of the required capital 
could be mobilized from these sources and if the combined value of donations from large 
donors and the general public was at least 50% of the required capital. In the event that 
the conservation program could not be launched, the contributions made would be 
refunded, but the interest generated from the funds during the campaigning period would 
be donated to organizations already involved in ongoing activities to save wildlife. In the 
‘without’ seed money and refund option, the funds mobilization campaign did not have 
seed money and refund features. In this payment mechanism, respondents were merely 
asked to decide whether or not they would pay a specified bid amount.   
The null hypotheses and the alternative hypotheses are listed below (E = expected 
value): 
H0: E (WTPmandatory tax) = E (WTPvoluntary contribution) 
Ha: E (WTPmandatory tax) ≠ E (WTPvoluntary contribution) 
H0: E (WTPmandatory tax with seed money) = E (WTPmandatory tax without seed money) 
Ha: E (WTPmandatory tax with seed money) ≠ E (WTPmandatory tax without seed money) 
H0: E (WTPvoluntary contribution with seed money & refund) =  E (WTPvoluntary contribution without seed money & refund) 
Ha: E (WTPvoluntary contribution with seed money & refund) ≠  E (WTPvoluntary contribution without seed money & refund) 
 
3.5 Elicitation Method, Price Bids and Sample Sizes 
The question on WTP was posed as a single bound dichotomous choice question 
for a one-time payment.   Negative responses to the WTP question were followed by an 
open-ended question on the amount that the respondent would be willing to pay.   
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The respondents were split into four groups according to the payment mechanism: 
(i) mandatory ‘with’ seed money, (ii) mandatory ‘without’ seed money, (iii) voluntary 
‘with’ seed money and refund, and (iv) voluntary ‘without’ seed money and refund.  
Donor samples were offered for option (iii) only. Five bid prices were used: (i) 100 Baht 
(2.94 USD), 150 Baht (4.4 USD), 250 Baht (7.4 USD), 1,000 Baht (29.4 USD), and 
3,000 Baht (88.2 USD)5. The respondents were randomly assigned to each of the 
payment mechanisms and then randomly divided into five groups for each bid price. 
 
Table 1. Price bids and distribution of samples by payment vehicles 
                           Unit: number of respondents  
Payment vehicles No. of respondents 
1. General Respondents  
    1.1 Mandatory  Tax  
• with seed money 229 
• without seed money 196 
    1.2  Voluntary Contribution  
• with seed money & refund 219 
• without seed money & refund 196 
2. Donors  
• voluntary contribution with seed money & refund 155 
 
It has been observed in past studies that the tendency is to be generous in verbal 
pledges of donations which might not be the case when real payments are involved, 
particularly in choices affecting animals (Johansson-Stenman and Svedsäter 2003; Farrell 
1995; Cummings and Taylor 1999). A ‘cheap talk script’ was therefore added to try and 
overcome the divergence between hypothetical willingness to pay and actual willingness 
to pay by addressing the issue of hypothetical bias in the subjects by alerting them to this 
inclination as well as  requesting for more careful consideration over their WTP answers 
(Cummings and Taylor 1999).  Also following the recommendations of past studies on 
the importance of reminders of substitutes and budget constraints (Freeman 1993; 
Champ, Boyle and Brown 2003), the respondents were asked to consider other pressing 




                                      
5 The exchange rate used was 34 Baht to 1 USD. 
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3.6 Experiments with Real Money 
According to the Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Festinger 1957), people’s 
decisions were in general, consistent and did not tend to conflict with previous behaviour 
— hence, the stated Mean Willingness to Pay (MWTP) under a hypothetical situation 
was likely to influence the ‘real’ MWTP (when real money was involved) as well as 
decisions on the trade-offs between self image, the individual’s private consumption, and 
the desirable changes in the quantity of the public good. Moreover, decisions would be 
influenced by the scale of financial incentives as self-image would be easier to buy if the 
amount of money required was small. 
   Some studies have pointed out that decision-making over trade-offs would be 
different between out-of-pocket money and ‘found money’, i.e., money or tokens given 
as part of the experiment.  In other words, people would tend to be more generous in the 
latter case, hence, researchers may over-estimate their generosity.  To minimize this 
effect, respondents in the general respondents category were informed from the beginning 
that the money for the experiment was, in actual fact, tokens of appreciation for the time 
spent on in-person interviews, hence, it was money earned (equivalent to out-of-pocket 
money) as opposed to found money6.  The enumerators started the interviews by asking 
the respondents to decide how to use the 100 Baht compensation given to them. They had 
a choice between (i) keeping the money, (ii) donating it to charitable organizations 
working with under-privileged people in Thailand, or (iii) donating it to charitable 
organizations working with wildlife7.  Two donation boxes were placed in front of the 
respondents; a ‘Blue Box’ for human welfare-related charity organizations and a ‘Green 
Box’ for wildlife organizations. Decisions were made in private in the absence of the 
enumerators. While not directly evaluating the differences between real and hypothetical 
situations, this experiment was included in the study to test the consistency between past 
charitable behaviour and attitudes to wildlife, and a situation where respondents were 
confronted by real decisions over the allocation of funds.    
 
4.0 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1 Demographic Profile of Respondents 
 Donors, based on 155 in-person interviews, were, in comparison to the general 
respondents, older and more educated.  Income-wise, they belonged to the affluent 
middle to higher income group.  Their mean income of 536,112 Baht/year8 was more 
than five times the average per capita income of 92,960 Baht/year 9 and more than twice 
the average income of those belonging to the general respondents group.     
                                      
6 This experiment did not include the donors who were already regular contributors to wildlife 
organizations and may therefore have had an inherent preference for the Green Box.  
7 The 100 Baht was given to the respondents in five 20 Baht notes. 
8 Conversion was made using the exchange rate of 34 Baht to 1 USD 
9 Source: National  Economic and Social Development Board. www.nesdb.go.th 
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The majority of the general respondents tended to fit into the lower income and 
the lower to middle income group with over 70% reportedly earning between 5,000 
Baht/month to 30,000 Baht/month, with mean income of 19,502 Baht/month10.  The 
differences between the donors and general respondents for all demographic variables are 
shown in Table 2.  Apart from significant differences in age and income, donors also 
tended to have higher levels of education while a higher percentage of them were women, 
a  lower percentage were married and on average, they had fewer children.   
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41.14 
(10.57) 





















































(1) Donors N = 155; General Respondents N = 840 
(2) The figures in parenthesis are standard deviations.  
(3) Differences between mean income, age and education between the donors and the general respondents 
were significant at the p<0.01 significance level. 
(4) Because of skewed distribution in (3) above, the non-parametric Mann-Whitney test was used for the . 
The difference was significant at the p< 0.01 significance level.  
 
                                      
10 These were reported individual incomes. 
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The mean income of the respondents for the mandatory tax payment mechanism 
pooled samples was 23,606 Baht/month, which was significantly higher than the mean 
income of the pooled samples for the voluntary contributions respondent group of 15,300 
Baht/month.  This difference can partly be attributable to the additional screening in the 
sampling procedure for respondents in the tax split sample who had to be registered 
taxpayers.  This meant the exclusion of several categories of self-employed people, those 
in the informal sector, and wage-earners.  
While there were statistically significant differences in income between the 
respondents in the mandatory and voluntary payment mechanisms, within each payment 
mechanism, the differences in income between the samples of ‘with’ and ‘without’ the 
added features in the payment mechanisms were generally not statistically significant.  
The only exception was the mean income of the respondents in the mandatory ‘with’ seed 
money option at 21,340 Baht/month, which was significantly lower than mean income of 
the mandatory ‘without’ seed money option of 26,178 Baht/month. For the voluntary 
payment mechanism, the mean income of the ‘with’ and ‘without’ seed money and 
refund options were comparable and were respectively 15,306 Baht/month and 15,293 
Baht/month.   
 
4.2 Attitudes and Preferences 
 
4.2.1 Concerns attached to wildlife extinction  
The importance the respondents attached to the problems of wildlife extinction is 
shown in Table 3.  It was based on the ranking of statements on current problems of the 
country in the order of how they thought public resources should be allocated. The 
overall rankings for both respondent groups were similar.   
Table 3.  Issues which should be top priority for public spending  
Number and %  of those who ranked the 
issue as top priority 
Problems needing urgent remedial measures 
Donors General Respondents 






































In general, environmental problems were not considered as urgent matters for 
public spending compared with other social and economic concerns11. Considered of 
even lower priority were wildlife issues. For the general respondents, wildlife extinction 
was rated at the lowest level of priority. For donors, the lowest priority was public health 
care services. A possible explanation for this could be perceptions that health services 
were already well-distributed and adequately covered.  
In addition to prioritizing the country’s pressing issues, respondents were asked to 
rate a set of statements which would reflect the attitudes and values attached to wildlife, 
perceptions over personal responsibilities and comparative importance between human 
and animal welfare.   A five-point Likert scale from ‘1’ for “strongly disagree” to ‘5’ for 
“strongly agree” was used.    Table 4, which reports the  percentages of those who gave 
the two highest scores of ‘5’ and ‘4’ for each statement, indicates similarities among the 
two respondent groups, and in some cases, notable differences in the degree and intensity 
of belief.  
  
Table 4.  Ratings of statements on environmental and wildlife-related issues  
                    Unit: number of respondents who voted “strongly agree” and “agree”   
Statement Donors General 
Respondents 
The government should raise more funds to deal with 





There are more important environmental concerns than 









It is everyone’s duty to ensure that plants and animals as we 





Citizens should contribute to endangered species conservation 





Endangered species are important even if I don’t get to see or 





The government should raise taxes to pay for more 





The government should invest in helping people before it 





Households who earn more income should pay higher taxes in 





Endangered species conservation should not be a priority 





Notes: Donors N = 88 (Some parts of the questionnaire were revised halfway. The first batch of donors interviewed did 
not have these questions.); General Respondents N = 840. Figures in parenthesis are percentages of the sample groups.  
                                      
11 The survey was conducted immediately after incidents of violence in the south of Thailand had become 
more frequent and the army had taken drastic measures in curtailing Muslim rebels in the southern 




The findings showed that donors felt more strongly about environmental 
concerns. This was more noticeable where the welfare of animals was concerned and 
where there were trade-offs for resource allocations.  For example, a lower percentage of 
donors ‘strongly agreed’ and ‘agreed’ with the statements that “There are more important 
environmental concerns than endangered species conservation”, “The government 
should invest in helping people before it spends money on endangered species”, and 
“Endangered species conservation should not be a priority concern of the government”. 
 
4.2.2 The market for charitable contributions to wildlife conservation 
The socio-economic profiles of the donors presented earlier suggest that demand 
for wildlife conservation as an environmental good was limited to the more affluent and 
higher educated.  Among the general respondents, just over 6% were, so to speak, regular 
contributors to wildlife charities (Table 5).  Most tended to be spontaneous contributors, 
i.e., people who occasionally donated when approached at events where campaigners (for 
charities) met potential suppliers, when they accidentally came across fundraisers, or 
generally when they were in a position to contribute without having to incur much 
transaction costs or without having to go out of their way (Tables 5 and 6).     
The act of giving tended to be more frequent when that act involved returns in the 
forms of goods and services.   Table 5 also shows that people contributed in exchange for 
goods (45%) such as T-shirts, stickers, or souvenirs, or in exchange for services such as 
attending charity concerts (11%).  In this situation, one can conjecture that contributions 
were motivated by the direct use value of the goods provided.  
Few general respondents contributed to charitable causes which required 
substantial effort on the part of the donor, and in situations where goods or services were 
not provided in exchange for the donations such as phoning-in during television and 
radio broadcasts, or transferring money into a bank account.   
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Table 5.  The nature of charitable giving  
Acts of charity 
 
Donors 
          
N = 155 
General 
Respondents 
N = 840 
Attended charity concert 51 94 
 (32.90) (11.20) 
Bought stickers, T-shirts 125 377 
 (80.60) (44.90) 
Charity walks 25 111 
 (16.10) (13.20) 
Regularly donated through bank account deductions 81 55 
 (52.30) (6.50) 
Phoned in to donate  when there requests on television or radio 
programs 16 34 
 (10.30) (4.00) 
Donated occasionally 142 584 
 (91.60) (69.50) 
Volunteered as helper when had free time 44 94 
 (28.40) (11.20) 
Donated gifts 102 409 
 (65.80) (48.70) 
Freed birds, turtles, and buffaloes 75 574 
 (48.40) (68.30) 
Bought bananas for elephants  walking the streets of Bangkok 55 516 
 (35.50) (61.40) 
Gave food to stray dogs and cats 89 434 
 (57.40) (51.70) 
Helped injured stray dog and cats  52 236 
 (33.50) (28.10) 
Supported activities related to wildlife 122 219 
 (78.70) (26.10) 
Other  6 4 
 (3.90) (0.50) 
Notes:  Multiple answers allowed. Figures in parenthesis are percentages of the sample groups. 
 
Findings on why people become involved in charitable activities suggest that 
efforts on the part of the organizations themselves do pay off (see Table 6).   Directly 
approaching the subject (38%), making information and delivery channels such as stalls 
and booths in department stores and exhibition halls conveniently accessible (32%), and 
providing credible information on the cause (29%) were found to be more effective ways 
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to trigger donations.  Positive peer group influence was also cited by a substantial number 
of respondents (20%).  
 
Table 6.  Reasons for contributing to charity 
Unit: number of respondents who voted “strongly agree” and “agree”  




N = 155 
General 
Respondents 
N = 840 
Happened to be at the event, exhibition or the booths 68 268 
 (43.90) (31.90) 
Directly approached by the organization 79 319 
 (51.00) (38.00) 
Happened to be feel charitable at that time 36 204 
 (23.20) (24.30) 
Encouraged by friends and people you knew 44 169 
 (28.40) (20.10) 
Saw other people donate and wanted to follow suit 2 16 
 (1.30) (1.90) 
Was afraid that people would think badly of you if you  did not 
donate 0 3 
 (0.00) (0.40) 
Someone you respected donated and you wanted to follow the good 
example 10 36 
 (6.50) (4.30) 
Donated because you did not want to be bothered 
 2 16 
 (1.30) (1.90) 
Wanted to support the cause of the organization which was 
campaigning for funds 111 242 
 (71.60) (28.80) 
Note:  Multiple answers allowed. Figures in parenthesis are percentages of the sample groups. 
 
Table 7 shows the feelings people experience after making charitable donations. 
The strongest sentiment appeared to be what literature on charitable actions describes as 
the “warm glow”.   Around 68% of general respondents strongly agreed or agreed to this 
statement: “You feel pleased with yourself because you’ve done something good”.  For 
others, it was the consolation of having done something useful — 52% strongly agreed or 
agreed with the statement: “You felt that at least you’ve contributed to solving the 
problem”. One other favourite statement, selected by nearly 30% of the respondents, 
reflected a sentiment that may be somewhat specific to the Thai religious and cultural 
setting: “You do something good and you are rewarded with merit”.  Only 28% said they 
were hopeful that the donation would help stimulate efforts to really solve the problem.  
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Table 7. Feelings after having made donations to charity 
 








Felt pleased about having done something good 100 569 
 (64.50) (67.70) 
Felt good for having at least  contributed to solving the problem 109 434 
 (70.30) (51.70) 
Felt hopeful that the money donated will lead to concrete 
measures to solve the problem 68 231 
 (43.90) (27.50) 
Did not feel anything much because the money given was not 
much and is unlikely to amount to anything 5 40 
 (3.20) (4.80) 
Felt that at least  you did your duty even though it is unlikely to 
amount to anything  22 104 
 (14.20) (12.40) 
You do something good and you are rewarded with merit 26 247 
 (16.80) (29.40) 
Wanted other people to know so they will follow 15 30 
 (9.70) (3.60) 
Wanted other people to know that I have done something good 0 11 
 (0.00) (1.30) 
Note:  Multiple answers allowed. Figures in parenthesis are percentages of the sample groups. 
 
4.2.3 Knowledge about wildlife  
 To make a broad assessment of their knowledge about the wildlife situation, the 
respondents were asked to read nine statements about wildlife and identify whether they 
were true or false, and to answer one question (Table 8).  In choosing the statements, the 
criteria was that the statements should not be so specific as to be restricted to only natural 
scientists, specialists or wildlife enthusiasts. The statements were either basic information 
that had been hot issues in the past or much publicized current events.  Four major 
observations were made based on the number/proportion of correct answers received.    
First, the percentage of correct answers in the donors group was higher than for 
the general respondents.  This partly supported the expectation that the donors would be 
more ‘knowledgeable’ than the average person in Bangkok, given the distinct difference 
in age, income and level of education highlighted earlier.   
Secondly, there were some questions in which the percentages of correct answers 
were lower for both respondent groups.  Among these was the statement “The Irawaddy 
dolphin is in the list of Thailand’s endangered species which is protected under CITES”. 
This was one statement of which a high percentage of correct answers was expected 
because apart from hosting the Conference of the Parties (COP)13, Thailand’s proposal 
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and getting approval for the moving of the Irawaddy dolphin (Orcaella Brevirostris) from 
Appendix 2 to Appendix 1 of CITES (Convention of International Trade on Endangered 
Species) was a much publicized issue12.  A high percentage of incorrect answers 
suggested that people did not, in general, closely follow the news about wildlife, and that 
there was limited interest in Thailand’s role as a host country for a major international 
meeting as well as in efforts made to heighten protection for one of Thailand’s 
endangered species. 
Thirdly, there were answers which reflected that people might not be aware of the 
current status of or threats to certain wildlife species. For instance, people erroneously 
thought that animals such as rhinoceroses and kouprey could still be found in the wilds of 
Thailand.  
Lastly, the possibility that the high percentages of correct responses was the result 
of successful guesswork could not be entirely dismissed.  An example of where 
guesswork might have played a role is the statement that the dugong is a type of sea lion.   
Among the respondents who answered correctly that this was a false statement were 
those who knew this for a fact and those who may have just guessed it correctly.  
There was also noted inconsistency between different sections of the 
questionnaire.  Among the general respondents, only 27% answered correctly that 
elephants were among the populations that were declining in the wilds, yet 80% said that 
they had heard that elephants faced the risk of extinction (Table 9).  Thus, the level of 
knowledge over wildlife situations may be lower than what is suggested in Table 8.   
 
                                      
12 CITES COP13 took place in Bangkok from October 2-14, 2004. 
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Table 8. Responses to knowledge index questions  
Number of respondents who 






answer Donors General 
Respondents 




The Irawaddy dolphin is in the list of Thailand’s 





Thailand is a member of CITES which is an 










Thung Yai Naresuan and Huey Kha Kaeng are wildlife 





Elephants are not among the species heading towards 





International tourists come to Thailand to see the 




















Notes:  Donors  N = 155;  General Respondents N = 840. Figures in parenthesis are percentages of the sample groups. 
 
4.2.4 Preferences and perceptions over the importance of wildlife and 
awareness of the risk of extinction 
People’s willingness to support conservation funds for endangered species can be 
influenced by their association of those species with various attributes.  This study 
adopted the approach used by Czech and Krausman (1999) which asked respondents to 
indicate relative values of eight types of species, (namely birds, mammals, reptiles, 
amphibians, fish, plants, invertebrates, and micro-organisms) in relation to eight 
‘prioritization’ factors.  Here, respondents were asked to assess each of the six 
endangered species on five attributes which might influence their perceived importance.  
The scale ranged from 1 for ‘least important’ up to 10 for ‘most important’.   The 
attributes were (i) apparent ecological importance, (ii) cultural, historical and sentimental 
value, (iii) monetary value, (iv)  being rare or facing the threat of extinction, or and (v) 
physical attractiveness 13  (Czech and Krausman 1999) (Table 9).  
                                      
13 For each animal, the enumerator would go through each of the attributes e.g., “Consider the elephant in 
terms of ecological importance. On a score of 1 to 10, how important do you think the elephant is?”  The 
enumerators were instructed to explain what the attributes themselves meant and to advise that it was 




One of the factors which might affect decisions to contribute to conservation or 
wildlife is the knowledge of the risk of extinction. The results shown in the last row in 
Table 9 suggest that the majority of the respondents were aware that some of Thailand’s 
relatively well-known wildlife species faced the risk of extinction. In the case of gibbons, 
however, the percentage of those being aware (56%) was notably lower.   
 
Table 9. Perceived importance of wildlife by selected attributes and awareness of the risk 
of extinction                                                                                          











































































Average scores of 
the 5 attributes 
8.03 7.19 7.5 7.4 6.76 7.29 
       















(1) General Respondents only, N = 840. 
(2) For rows 1-5, the figures in parenthesis are standard deviation values. 
(3) For the last row, the figures in parenthesis are percentages of the total number of respondents. 
 
As with the Czech and Krausman (1999) and Tisdell and Wilson (2006) studies, 
which asked respondents to assess whether their knowledge of a particular species was 
‘poor’, ‘good’ or ‘very good’, measurements under this exercise were arbitrary in the 
sense that scores were based on the respondents’ judgments and prior knowledge.  Like 
in the Tisdell and Wilson (2006) study, scores were used in a qualitative manner and not 
as cardinal measures which would require high levels of precision.  The main objective 
here was to capture the general perceptions of the Bangkok population regarding the 
relative importance of the endangered wildlife species. This did not necessarily have to 
be in accord with the actual status, but information on what the general public knew or 
were aware of could be of value to policy-makers.  
Based on the average scores of all five attributes, elephants were considered as 
being of highest importance (8), followed by tigers (7.5), hornbills (7.4), marine turtles 
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(7.3), dugongs (7.2), and lastly, gibbons (6.8). Comparing the ranking of each attribute 
revealed interesting variations.  On the attribute ‘cultural, historical and sentimental 
value’, elephants had the highest score.  This supports the observation that ethics, 
morality and social influences can contribute to the perceived likeability of a species 
(Tisdell and Wilson 2006).  Marine turtles were rated as of highest importance in terms of 
‘apparent ecological importance’ while dugongs were voted, out of the six, as the most 
important in terms of being ‘rare and near extinction’.  Probably based on perceptions of 
tradable economic value, tigers were rated the highest for ‘monetary value’ (7.8), 
followed by marine turtles (6.9).  Elephants ranked third (6.8) due to their charismatic 
and economic value in the tourism industry as well as in the rather profitable business of 
walking elephants in the streets of Bangkok and other urban residential areas for well-
intentioned urbanites to buy bananas to feed the elephant and make money for the 
mahoots (people who take care of the elephants) and the elephant owners.   
For the pairing exercise where the 840 general respondents were asked to state 
their priority of allocation of public resources, the order of preferences was: (i) dugongs, 
(ii) hornbills, (iii) elephants, (iv) marine turtles, (v) tigers and (vi) gibbons.   What this 
means is that every time the picture of a dugong was paired with another of the six 
animals, the majority of the respondents always chose to allocate conservation resources 
to the dugongs. In contrast, each time the picture of the gibbon was paired with another 
animal, the majority of the respondents always chose the other animal and not the gibbon.  
Between the most preferred and the least preferred were the four remaining animals. The 
hornbill in the second place suggests that although most respondents chose the dugong 
rather than the hornbill, between the hornbill and the four other animals, the majority of 
the people chose the hornbill.     
The respondents’ choices could have been conditioned by a combination of 
factors. At the lowest level of summation, the rankings may reflect nothing more than 
reactions to the photographs shown.  One could interpret the above results to mean that 
the respondents simply liked the photograph of the dugong more than the other animal it 
was paired with. In contrast, we can say that most people liked the gibbon’s photograph 
less than the photos of the other animals.  At another level, it is also possible that the 
photographs shown served as mental links.  In other words, the choices had nothing to do 
with the photographs per se, but were based on information the respondents may have 
already had or their pre-existing personal likes or dislikes for each animal. People might 
think, for example, that gibbons did not face as much risk of extinction based on prior 
notions of abundance because many people kept them as pets or because greater numbers 
of gibbons could be seen in zoos compared to the other five animals. Similarly, people 
might not perceive the importance of protecting wild tigers if they could be found in zoos 
or safari parks.   A third possible interpretation, and one that would be valuable to policy-
makers, is that in making the choices, the respondents were considering the trade-offs as 
requested.  If this were the case, in looking at the photos of the dugong paired with the 
hornbill for example, the respondents would have asked themselves, “Between the 
dugong and the hornbill, which animal would I prefer the government to allocate 
resources to protect?”  The allocation of resources to save one animal would be based on 
the understanding that this would mean fewer resources to save the other.  If this were the 
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case, the results could be used as one aspect of information, in conjunction with other 
data, to support decision-making in prioritizing the allocation of resources. 
 
4.2.5 Trust in usage of funds for wildlife protection and conservation 
 One factor that was expected to influence people’s decision was the extent to 
which they believed the money donated would be used for whatever stated objectives.  
The respondents in both groups were asked to estimate what percentage of the money that 
people donated for the stated purposes actually reached the intended recipients.  The 
results suggested that around 64% of the donors believed that 50% or more of the 
donations would be used for the stated purposes.  Among these, as much as 25% believed 
that all the money reached the target recipients.  By comparison, only 56% of the general 
respondents believed that 50% or more of the donation money reached the intended 
beneficiaries. However, among these, only 22% of this group believed that 80% of the 
money reached the intended target and only 8% thought that all the donations would be 
used as intended.   
 
Table 10. Perceptions over percentage of donation funds being used for the stated 
purposes 
Percentage of contribution 


























Notes: Donors N = 155; General Respondents N = 840. Figures in parenthesis are percentages of the total 
sample sizes. 
 
4.2.6 Results from the experiment with real money 
Field experiments with real money generated some interesting results. Table 11 
below shows that very few people kept most of the 100 Baht given to them (4%) and 
around 19% kept 60 Baht and more.  Forty-three percent (43%) of the total donation fund 
was for wildlife conservation and 41% for human-related charities. The difference in the 
proportion was too small to conclude that there was a slightly higher preference for 
wildlife causes.   It indicated nevertheless, that there were no clear-cut preferences for 




Table 11.  Frequency of givers to wildlife and human-related charities, Bangkok 2006                                    
Amount of money 
Kept (Baht) 
Frequency of  
respondents who 
kept the money 
Frequency of givers 
to Green Box  
(wildlife) 
Frequency of givers 







































Notes: The experiment was conducted only with the 840 general respondents. The figures in parenthesis are 
percentages of the sample groups. 
 
4.3 Willingness to Pay for the Protection and Conservation of Wildlife 
 As stated earlier, after the enumerators had read out the CV scenario, the 
respondents were then asked whether or not they would be willing to pay specified 
amounts.  The five bids used in the split samples were 100 Baht, 150 Baht, 250 Baht, 
1,000 Baht and 3,000 Baht.   
 
4.3.1 Distribution of samples by bids and payment vehicles   
The information in Table 12 below confirmed a-priori expectations that 
willingness to pay was sensitive to bid prices.   At the lowest bid of 100 Baht, over 80% 
of the respondents for each payment mechanism was willing to pay for the protection and 
conservation of the six wildlife species. As the bids increased, the percentages of ‘Yes’ 
responses declined. In the general respondents group, at the highest bid of 3,000 Baht, the 
percentages of ‘Yes’ responses reduced to 9% – 15% of the respondents in the split 
samples.    
For the mandatory payment mechanism, the referendums which gained majority 
support were for the three lower bids.  For the middle bid, which was a one-time payment 
of 250 Baht, 71% voted to support the referendum for the ‘with’ seed money option and 
66% voted for the ‘without’ seed money option.    At the higher bid price of 1,000 Baht, 
however, less than 50% of the respondents voted ‘for’ each of the referendums.  
Overall, the results for voluntary contributions to fund both ‘with’ and ‘without’ 
seed and refund options were similar although the percentages of ‘Yes’ responses for 
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each bid level were lower than for the mandatory payment mechanism.  At the lowest bid 
price, around 80% were willing to make voluntary contributions.  At the middle bid of 
250 Baht, the percentage dropped to around 50% and at the highest bid price of 3,000 
Baht only, 9% – 15% of the samples in these groups were willing to pay. 
For the 155 respondents in the donors group who responded only to voluntary 
contributions ‘with’ seed money and refund options, there were no significant changes in 
the percentages of ‘Yes’ responses which were around 92% as the bid price increased 
from 100 Baht to 150 Baht.  At the highest bid of 3,000 Baht, the percentage of donors 
willing to pay was still high at about 58% while  the percentages of ‘Yes’ responses for 
all other payment vehicles had dropped drastically; the highest being 14% for the 
mandatory payment ‘with’ seed money.  
As mentioned earlier, ‘No’ responses to the specified bids were followed by open-
ended questions on the amount that the respondents would be willing to pay.  Of the 427 
general respondents who initially said ‘No’ to the specific bid price offered, 71% said 
they would be willing to pay lower amounts.   The sums ranged from 10 Baht up to 2,000 
Baht and around 35% said they would be willing to make a one-time payment of 100 
Baht14. A follow-up question was asked on why the respondent voted against the specific 
referendum (each respondent was given one bid price for one payment vehicle only) or 
why he/she was not willing to pay.  The most common answer (56%) was not being able 
to afford the amount.    
   
 
                                      
14 When we asked the 464 respondents (general respondents and donors) who originally said ‘No’ to the bid 
amounts they were presented with how much they would be willing to pay, 303 out of these said they 
would pay a lower amount.  The mean WTP for the 303 respondents who would be willing to pay other bid 
amounts was 298 Baht; the standard deviation was 360.8; and the mode and median was 100 Baht.   
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Notes:   
(1) The figures in parenthesis are percentages of ‘Yes’ responses by the stated number of respondents in 
each split sample.  
(2) Number of respondents in the general respondents mandatory tax (with seed money) sample: 100 Baht 
N=38; 150 Baht N=40; 250 Baht N=38; 1,000 Baht N=55; 3,000 Baht N=58. 
(3) Number of respondents in the general respondents mandatory tax (without seed money) sample: 100 
Baht N=40; 150 Baht N=39; 250 Baht N=41; 1,000 Baht N=38; 3,000 Baht N=38. 
(4) Number of respondents in the general respondents voluntary contribution (with seed money and refund) 
sample: 100 Baht N=40; 150 Baht N=39; 250 Baht N=39; 1,000 Baht N=54; 3,000 Baht N=47. 
(5) Number of respondents in the general respondents voluntary contribution (without seed money and 
refund) sample: 100 Baht N=40; 150 Baht N=38; 250 Baht N=39; 1,000 Baht N=39; 3,000 Baht N=40. 
(6) Number of respondents in the donors voluntary contribution (with seed money and refund) sample: 100 
Baht N=26; 150 Baht N=28; 250 Baht N=37; 1,000 Baht N=31; 3,000 Baht N=33.  
 
Several statements could be treated as ‘protest votes’ as they reflected mistrust in 
the payment mechanism as well as uncertainty about the expected outcome.   Table 13 
shows that 25 respondents were not convinced that the money would be used for the 
stated objectives while six thought that they were not sure that the institutional support 
could really be set up.    
After removing 31 protests votes from the sample (28 general respondents and 3 
donors), the total sample size (general respondents and donors combined) was reduced to 
964 samples (Table 14). The protest votes relate to the statements shown in bold in Table 
13. The willingness to pay responses in Table 14 show that the majority of the 
respondents would still be willing to pay for the three lowest bids.   
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Table 13. Reasons for answering ‘No’ to the WTP question 
Reasons Number of 
respondents 
% of those who 
answered ‘No’ 
Cannot afford the amount 90 55.9 
Not sure that the money will be used for 
the stated objectives 
25 15.5 
The contribution  is unlikely to have much 
impact 
9 5.6 
Do not like the compulsory nature of the 
program  
13 8.1 
The planned activities are unlikely to 
generate the expected results 
9 5.6 
Not sure that the institutional support can 
really be set up 
6 3.7 
It should be the responsibility of the 
government 
5 3.1 
It is not an immediate problem and concern 4 2.5 
 
Note: The total number of ‘No’s = 161 respondents. The total number who said ‘No’ initially was 464 (427 
general respondents and 37 donors).  Then after asking whether they were certain about saying ‘No’, only 
161 respondents said they were. Multiple responses were allowed. 
 
Table 14.  The number of respondents willing to pay the different bid prices (protests 
votes removed)                                                                                               
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money 
































































Notes: N = 964. The figures in parenthesis are percentages of ‘Yes’ responses by the number of respondents in each 
split sample. 
 
Respondents who were ‘uncertain’ were treated as ‘No’s in the analysis. The most 
common reason underlying the uncertainty, similar to why the respondents answered 
‘No’, was the sum of the one-time payment.   Much of the uncertainty was also related to 
the institutional set-up to implement the project.  Around 27%, for example, thought that 
the implementing organization should be set up first while another 25% were concerned 
about the transparency of the implementing organization (Table 15). 
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Table 15. Reasons for answering ‘Uncertain’ to the WTP question                                                                    
Reasons Number of 
respondents 
% of those who 
answered ‘Uncertain’ 
The sum requested is too high 140 46.2 
Not sure  about the transparency of the 
implementing organization 
77 25.4 
The implementing organization need to be set up 
first 
82 27.1 
It should be the responsibility of the government 2 0.7 
Would rather help people first 2 0.7 
Note: The total number of ‘uncertain’ respondents = 303 from the total of 995 respondents (both donors 
and general respondents). 
 
 For those whose decision was to vote ‘for’ the referendums or to voluntarily pay, 
the common reasons were because they wanted to support the effort and that the sum 
requested was not too high (Table 16).  The necessity of having a fund to support 
conservation activities was the third most common response. 
 
Table 16. Reasons for answering ‘Yes’ to the WTP question 
Reasons Number of 
respondents 
% of those who 
answered ‘Yes’ 
Want to support the effort 339 63.8 
The sum requested is not too high 116 21.9 
Think that having a fund is important 71 13.4 
It is our responsibility to help 3 0.6 
Want the public sector to help 2 0.4 
Note: Both donors and general respondents combined, N = 531  
 
4.3.2 Factors influencing willingness to pay 
The analysis of the factors that influenced willingness to pay was done by using 
multivariate logistic regression.  In addition to the demographic variables, the logit model 
included two behavioural variables such as ‘Kindex’ (knowledge index) which was the 
number of correct answers from the true or false statements about wildlife discussed 
earlier. The other variable was ‘Trust’ which reflected the respondents’ perceptions over 
the percentage of the donated money that would be used for the stated objectives15.   The 
variables, descriptions and expected signs are shown in Table 17.   
                                      
15 Information on ‘Kindex’ and ‘Trust’‘ are in Tables 8 and 10 respectively.  
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Table 17. Variable descriptions, means, standard deviations and expected signs  
Variable Description Expected sign 
Age Years + 
Gender   1 = male; 0 = otherwise + 
Education No. of years of schooling + 
Marital status 1 = married; 0 = otherwise N.A. 
Children Number of children - 
Kindex Scores from 10 knowledge questions + 
Trust The percentage of the donations that 
respondents believed would be used by the 




The results of the multivariate logistic regressions shown in Table 18 conformed 
with theoretical expectations. The estimation parameters for the bids were significant at 
the p<0.01 significance level.  Consistent with the economic theory of demand, the 
probability of a ‘Yes’ answer to the WTP question was inversely related to the bid price. 
At high bid prices, respondents were less likely to vote ‘for’ the referendums or be 
willing to pay the bid amounts to support the Wildlife Protection and Conservation Fund.    
There was some variability in the results of the logit models for the different 
payment mechanisms. The coefficients of the income variable were positive and 
significant at p<0.01 for the mandatory tax pooled, voluntary contribution pooled and all 
pooled samples. The income variable for the voluntary contribution with seed money and 
refund was also significant at p<0.01.  For the mandatory tax with seed money and 
pooled samples of general respondents, the income variables were significant at p<0.05. 
For the mandatory tax payment ‘with’ seed money option, the ‘expenditure’ 
variable was used instead of ‘income’. The variable was significant at p<0.05 and had a 
negative coefficient sign indicating that the higher the expenditure, the lower probability 
of willingness to pay.   
As expected, the coefficients for the variable ‘Trust’ were positive and significant 
in all the logit models with the exception of the mandatory tax payment vehicles. This 
implied that the more trust people had that the money donated would be used for the 
purpose it was asked for, the higher the probability that respondents would vote ‘for’ the 
referendums or answer ‘Yes’ to the willingness to pay question in the voluntary payment 
mechanisms.  
 In addition to the pooled samples for the mandatory tax payment vehicle and the 
voluntary contribution, additional tests were done to test the payment vehicle effects for 
two additional pooled samples.  One was for all the general respondents and the other 
was for all the general respondents and donors. Payment vehicles were included as 
dummy variables, and only PV2 (mandatory tax ‘without’ seed money) was significant 
suggesting that there was a higher probability of a positive response to the WTP question 
if posed as a mandatory tax without the seed money feature than as a voluntary 
contribution to a trust fund. In the pooled sample model with both the general 
respondents and donors (shown in the last column of Table 18), there was a higher 
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probability of respondents saying ‘Yes’ to both the mandatory tax ‘without’ seed money 
and the voluntary contribution ‘with’ seed money and refund option than to the 
mandatory tax ‘with’ seed money and voluntary contribution ‘without’ seed money and 
refund options. 
Table 18. Logistic regression results for determinants of willingness to pay  
































































































































































































































.282 .300 .288 .270 .254 .249 .257 .247 
Nagellkerke .395 .400 .384 .363 .339 .333 .343 .330 
Notes:  
(1)  *** = significant at p<0.01, ** = significant at p<0.05 and * = significant at p<0.1 
(2)  a/ Expenditure is used as an income proxy for this variable. 
(3) PV1 = mandatory tax ‘with’ seed money; PV2 = mandatory tax ‘without’ seed money; PV3 = voluntary 
contribution ‘with’ seed money and refund; and PV4 = voluntary contribution ‘without’ seed money and refund (as 
PV4 is used as the base case, it is not shown in this computerised SPSS output). 
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4.3.3 Mean willingness to pay (MWTP) 
 The parametric approach was used to estimate the mean and median WTP. The 
mean WTP was estimated using the formula: 
Mean WTP = - α    
                                                 β  
where β is the coefficient on the bid amount and α is the estimated constant.  Table 19 
shows the estimation of the MWTPs per household (hh) for the uncensored data set both 
in Baht and USD using the parametric and non-parametric methods. The MWTP was the 
highest for the mandatory payment mechanism; the mandatory tax ‘with’ seed money 
option was 1,047 Baht/hh equivalent to a one-time payment of around 31 USD/hh.   
Without the seed money feature, the MWTP was 878 Baht/hh or around 26 USD/hh.  For 
the voluntary payment mechanism, MWTPs for funds ‘with’ and ‘without’ the seed 
money and refund option were almost the same at 618 Baht/hh and 627 Baht/hh, 
respectively (approximately 18 USD/hh). The MWTP values estimated after removing 
the 28 ‘protest’ votes from the general respondents group are shown in Table 20.  
 





















Tax with seed money (N = 229) 1,047 752 31 22 
Tax without seed money (N = 
196) 878 652 26 19 
Voluntary contribution with seed 
money and refund (N = 219) 618 584 18 17 
Voluntary contribution without 
seed money and refund (N = 196) 627 637 18 18 
Pooled tax (N = 425) 972 706 29 20 
Pooled voluntary contribution 
fund (N = 415) 621 611 18 18 
Total pooled sample (N = 840) 1,051 660 31 19 
































Tax with seed money (N = 224) 1,091 769 32.1 22.6 
Tax without seed money (N = 
188) 901 670 26.5 19.7 
Voluntary contribution with seed 
money and refund with seed     
(N = 211) 598 583 17.6 17.2 
Voluntary contribution without 
seed money and refund (N = 189) 575 601 16.9 17.7 
Pooled tax (N = 412) 1,006 728 29.6 21.4 
Pooled voluntary contribution 
fund (N = 400) 586 594 17.2 17.5 
Total pooled sample (N = 812) 802 662 23.6 19.5 
Note: Exchange rate @ 34 Baht to 1 USD 
 
4.3.4  Payment vehicle effect tests  
 One of the objectives of this study was to analyse the impacts of the payment 
vehicles on the decision to pay or not to pay. The study also aimed at analyzing whether 
or not the inclusion of specific features of the funds mobilizing campaign would increase 
the likelihood of respondents being willing to pay. The results of the tests run are given in 
Table 21 and discussed below. 
 
a. Mandatory  vs. voluntary payment mechanism 
The study determined whether the payment mechanism would have an effect on 
the willingness to pay. Would respondents react differently to mandatory and voluntary 
payment mechanisms? A dummy variable ‘pvehicle’ was included in the logit model 
(mandatory = 1; voluntary = 0). The variable pvehicle was significant at the p<0.05 level 
and the coefficient sign was positive. This meant that there was a higher probability of 
respondents being more willing to pay to a mandatory rather than a voluntary payment 
mechanism and also being willing to pay more in such a case (Table 21). In Table 19, the 
MWTP for the pooled tax sample was 972 Baht/hh, significantly higher than the MWTP 
of 621 Baht/hh for the pooled sample for the voluntary contribution to a fund.  In Table 
20, with protest votes removed, the MWTP for the two payment vehicles for the pooled 
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seed money vs 
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(2) 
Voluntary contribution 
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Nagellkerke 0.329 0.368 0.305 
Notes:  
(1)   Mandatory tax N = 412; Voluntary contribution N = 400 
(2)   Mandatory tax with seed money N = 224; Mandatory tax without seed money N = 188. 
(3) Analysis does not include donors; Voluntary contribution with seed money & refund N = 211; Voluntary 
contribution without seed money & refund N =189. 
(4) *** significant at p<0.01, ** significant at p<0.05 and * significant at p<0.1 
 
 b. Mandatory tax ‘with’ vs. ‘without’ seed money 
A second hypothesis was whether the MWTP for the mandatory payment 
mechanism ‘with’ seed money would be statistically different from the ‘without’ 
scenario.  Column 2 of Table 21 shows the results of the regession of the logit model with 
a dummy variable ‘s_tax’ (with = 1; without = 0).  The MWTP for tax with seed money 
using the parametric method was 1,091 Baht while the MWTP for tax without seed 
money was 901 Baht/person (Table 20). Using the non-parametric method, the MWTPs 
were respectively 769 Baht/hh and 670 Baht/hh.  The difference between both, however, 
was not statistically significant, hence, the decision to answer ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ was not 
influenced by the seed money feature of the funds mobilization campaign.   
 
c. Voluntary contribution ‘with’ vs. ‘without’ seed money and refund option 
Similarly, a test was run to determine whether the MWTP would be statistically 
different with the inclusion of the seed money and refund option in the voluntary 
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payment mechanism.  The dummy variable in this logit model was ‘s_fund’  (with = 1; 
without = 0).  The results in Table 21 show that there was no significant difference in the 
MWTPs.  Referring back to Table 20, the parametric estimates for MWTPs were quite 
close at 598 Baht/hh in the ‘with’ seed and refund case and 575 Baht/hh for the ‘without’ 
while the non-parametric estimates were respectively 583 Baht/hh and 601 Baht/hh. 
Thus, the inclusion of seed and refund options did not have the expected impact of 
increasing the probability of willingness to pay. 
 
4.3.5 Extrapolation of WTP benefits 
 The extrapolation of WTP benefits was done using the values of the MWTP for 
the pooled voluntary and mandatory payment mechanisms, the latest 2006 population 
statistics of Bangkok and the number of taxpayers in the different income groups.     
 Under the voluntary payment mechanisms, based on the MWTP for a one-time 
payment of 586 Baht/hh (Table 20) and Bangkok’s population of 2,150,706 households 
(NESDB 2006), the potential funds that can be mobilized is 1,260 million Baht or 
approximately 37 million USD16. 
 
Table 22. Total willingness to pay 
Voluntary Contribution Mandatory Tax 
MWTP (Baht/hh) 586 Highest bid passing 
referendum (Baht/hh) 
250 
Total number of hhs in 
Bangkok 
2,150,706 Total number of 
taxpayers in Bangkok 
2,268,902 
 
  Total number of hhs 
paying (assuming 2 tax 
payers/hh) 
1,134,451 
Total sum (mil. Baht) 1,260 Total sum (mil. Baht) 284 
Total sum (mil. USD) 37 Total sum (mil. USD) 8.4 
Note: A referendum is deemed to have ‘passed’ if the majority of respondents vote for it. 
 
Under the mandatory payment vehicle, the MWTP for the pooled sample was 972 
Baht/hh (Table 19). Were the referendum to have passed at the bid price of 1,000 Baht, 
then it would have been possible to use the MWTP for that price to extrapolate that the 
potential funds that could be mobilized under the mandatory payment mechanism.  As 
seen in Table 12, however, the referendum only passed for the three lower bids; the 
highest bid price being only 250 Baht.  Given that the referendum passed at 250 Baht and 
assuming that there are two tax payers per household on average and that only one 
taxpayer per household were to pay, 1.13 million households (from the current 2.26 
million Bangkok taxpayers) would pay this one-time payment and the potential 
mobilizable sum would be 284 million Baht or 8.4 million USD. 
                                      




5.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The aim of this study was to examine the motivations for charitable behaviour of 
private contributors towards the conservation of specific endangered wildlife of Thailand.  
In addition, the study used the contingent valuation method to estimate such non-use 
values as well as to test the responsiveness of the Bangkok population to incentives 
included in the different payment vehicles.   
The results confirmed that the regular contributors to wildlife protection and 
conservation measures belonged to the somewhat more affluent socio-economic group. 
There were also significant differences in terms of age, level of education, perceptions 
and attitudes over the wildlife sector.  
 The results of a multivariate logit analysis showed that there was a significant 
payment vehicle effect. There was a higher probability that respondents would answer 
‘Yes’ to the valuation question for the mandatory rather than the voluntary payment 
mechanism.  Respondents were willing to pay a higher one-time payment of 1,006 Baht 
compared to 586 Baht for a voluntary payment.   
Unlike experiences in developed countries where studies have shown the positive 
influence of incentives included in payment mechanisms, the results of this study showed 
that for both the mandatory and voluntary payment mechanisms, the inclusion of features 
such as seed money and refund options did not have the intended effect of sending out 
signals of the credibility of the funds mobilization campaign and increasing the 
probability of willingness to pay.  There were no significant statistical differences 
between the MWTPs for mandatory tax ‘with’ and ‘without’ seed money and between the 
MWTPs for the voluntary contributions ‘with’ and ‘without’ the seed money and refund 
option.  
The results of the multivariate analysis revealed that ‘Bid’ and ‘Income’ were 
significant determinants of willingness to pay.  A variable which was also found to be 
significant determinant was the level of ‘Trust’ or prior perceptions people had over the 
percentage of contributions that would be used for the stated objectives. There were 
variations in the influence of attitudinal variables in the logit models for the different 
payment mechanisms with no clear-cut relationship between attitudes and willingness to 
pay.  
Finally, the CVM was used in this study to estimate the willingness to pay for a 
group of Thailand’s endangered species rather than for all endangered wildlife or a 
specific endangered species. Policy-wise, the results suggest that a mandatory payment 
mechanism has a higher probability of obtaining public support. The results also indicate 
that it is likely that most people would accept an income tax surcharge at a bid price of 
250 baht. In this case, the total sum that could be mobilized would be 8.4 million USD. 
This is no small sum taking into consideration normal conservation budgets.  In 2007, for 
example, the budget allocated to the Wildlife Conservation Office under the National 
Park, Wildlife and Plant Conservation Department was 407 million Baht or around 12 
million USD whereas the budget for the Department of Marine and Coastal Resource was 
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only 45.16 million Baht or 1.33 million USD. Funds for specific endangered species 
represented even smaller fractions of both departments’ budgets. Therefore, the sum that 
could be raised from a mandatory income tax surcharge of only 250 Baht per household 
could sufficiently finance a comprehensive and integrated programme on the 
conservation of the six endangered terrestrial and marine species covered in this study. It 
is thus recommended that policy-makers and parties involved in wildlife conservation 
seriously consider the findings of this study in future plans to raise funds to save 
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